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Coca, Clausewitz, and Colombia: The Inadequacy of Micro-level Studies in 
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Studies of micro-level violence make various claims to universality: namely, that there are patterns of 
violence in civil wars that are observable across time and space. The analysis of rebel violence against 
civilians constitutes one of the enduring themes of these studies. By evaluating the actions of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) during the latter half of the Colombian civil war, 
this paper demonstrates that the claims of micro-level studies are unable to account for FARC’s violence 
against civilians. In response, this study provides an alternative framework for understanding FARC’s 
violence. Informed by the theories of Carl von Clausewitz it is possible to comprehend the logic of 
FARC’s violence against civilians within a strategic framework that aimed to advance the movement’s 
political goals. However, it also illustrates that FARC was influenced heavily by its involvement in the 
drugs trade. The main findings are a) that whilst FARC’s acts of violence may have contained 
similarities to that of other drugs cartels FARC did not become a narco-guerrilla organization, b) the 
case of FARC demonstrates that ultimately there are no reproducible patterns in war, micro-level or 
otherwise 
 
From 1964 to 2016 the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) maintained an armed 
revolt against the Colombian government. Founded as a Marxist-Leninist peasant movement 
FARC evolved into a powerful military force. It generated substantial revenue from the taxation 
of narcotics and operated a parallel state across vast swathes of the country. Narcotics came to 
have a significant impact on FARC from the second half of the Colombian Civil War, a period 
that saw rising levels of violence against civilians. It was this period that transformed FARC from 
a relatively small rural movement to an organization that presented a severe challenge to the 
authority of the state in both military and administrative capacity. The argument in this paper is 
that academic studies seeking to extract generalizable theories about the practice of violence 
against civilians in conditions of civil war fall short when they are applied to the case of FARC. 





populations in the areas it controlled, arose from specific historical and ideological conditions.1 
Understanding these conditions, this analysis contends, illustrates why micro-level studies of 
violence against civilians have struggled to provide satisfactory explanations of FARC. 
The contention set forth here is not that existing micro-level studies of violence against 
civilians are without merit. These studies do shed light on aspects of FARC’s use of violence. 
However, as shall be discussed, the attempt to discern generalizable patterns of activity at the 
micro-level in civil wars reveals the weaknesses of universalistic explanations. By contrast, this 
analysis critiques universalizing micro-level studies and offers an alternative consideration of 
FARC’s violence against civilians.  
Following a brief historical outline of FARC, this study will discuss the ideas advanced by 
a number of thinkers – Stathis Kalyvas, Claire Metelits and Jeremy Weinsten – who have written 
extensively on the subject of violence in civil wars, and demonstrate how their theorizations 
cannot account for FARC’s perpetration of violence against the civil populace. The paper will 
advance a more plausible framework for understanding FARC’s violence during the Colombian 
Civil War. This framework posits a dual approach that, firstly, emphasizes a Clausewitzian 
understanding of FARC’s violence as an extension of politics through war. It will show how 
FARC’s activities validate the thinking of the Prussian solder-scholar, Carl von Clausewitz’s 
claim that “policy permeates all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature will 
admit, will have a continuous influence on them.”2 Secondly, the framework focuses on how the 
narcotics trade became integral to FARC’s identity. The movement’s relationship with narcotics 
shaped its actions and provided the financial means to prolong the civil war, pulling it into 
conflict with landowners and other paramilitary groups. This augmented system of violence led 
some academics to accentuate FARC’s “criminal” deeds at the expense of understanding FARC’s 
political objectives: an emphasis that does not provide adequate or satisfactory insights into the 





Before proceeding, it is necessary to outline how a number of terms will be used in this 
paper. The term “violence” is defined as any act or behavior intended to cause physical harm or 
damage to persons or property. FARC employed a varied repertoire of violence during the civil 
war, and by “repertoires of violence” we mean the types, and relative proportions, of violence 
that an armed group might use against non-combatants, such as homicide, extortion, kidnapping 
and robbery.3 By “micro-level” this analysis refers to studies that examine intracommunity 
dynamics and interactions within small groups and among individuals.4 Further, FARC have 
been described as “rebels,” “guerrillas” and “narco-guerrillas.” The movement bore the 
hallmarks of all these terms but we do not believe that in and of themselves they are accurate 
descriptors. We shall therefore use the more detached term of ‘armed non-state actor’ to refer to 
FARC. Finally, the argument here engages with a literature set that it discerns as “universalistic” 
in nature, that is to say, studies that advance explanations which seek to account for general 
behaviors across time and space. The discussion employs the qualifiers “unsatisfactory” and 
“inadequate” to describe these universalistic theories in that, when set against evidence, they do 
not sufficiently explain or account for the violent actions of the FARC movement. 
 
The Political Development of FARC 
The origins of FARC reside in 1964 in the Tolima foothills when 42 activists took over five small 
municipalities in the southern part of Colombia. Originally affiliated with the Communist Party 
of Colombia (PCC), its political goals were large-scale land redistribution and the overthrow of 
the Colombian government. Since independence from Spain in 1819, Colombian governments 
led by the Conservative Party enacted land laws mainly to the benefit of the hacendados (large 
estate owners). These laws legitimized land seizures and asserted the rights of private property 
owners over the peasants (campesinos) already living on the land.5 In 1926 the Supreme Court 





causing conflict amongst the colonos (settlers) who began to resort to violence in order to assert 
their interests.  
The Liberal Party came to power in 1930 after almost 50 years of Conservative rule. In 
1932 agrarian reforms were introduced whereby individuals could acquire legal ownership of 
public lands merely by working the land.6 Tensions between Conservatives and Liberals grew, 
culminating in April 1948 with the assassination of Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, 
which initiated the period known as La Violencia: lasting between 1948 and 1966 and estimated to 
have caused over 200,000 deaths. During this period attacks against the campesinos and forced 
land-seizures became widespread, compelling rural dwellers and indigenous peoples to form into 
self-defence groups, often aligned with the Communist Party. The conflict between the Liberals 
and Conservatives ended in 1958 with the creation of the Frente Nacional, a bipartisan 
arrangement that allowed for a rotating presidency. The Frente consolidated control of the state 
apparatus in the hands of the elites, thus constraining most forms of political activism.7 However, 
violence against the peasantry continued, reinforcing the need for self-defence groups and 
causing more rural laborers to move to areas like Guayabero and Tolima where these collectives 
were located. 
FARC was constituted formally in 1966 and combined a zeal for agrarian reform along 
with the organizational and military experience of the Communist Party. Ortiz states: “the 
agricultural bias for the FARC’s ideological framework reflected the makeup of its leadership and 
members, which included landless peasants as well as small rural landowners.”8 Building on 
extensive ties with the local population the movement began to displace the state in the areas it 
controlled. At the Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982 FARC added the suffix “EP” - Ejército 
del Pueblo (People’s Army) – to its name and became FARC-EP, thus embellishing its credentials 
as a revolutionary organization separate from the PCC and signaling the intent to pass from a 





comprised a small army of some 3,000 personnel, based on a centralized hierarchical structure 
with a general staff and military code, along with a political program.10  
Throughout the 1980s FARC attempted to establish a legal political wing. The 
administration of President Belisario Betancur started peace talks with the movement, which 
resulted in the 1984 Uribe accords, a bilateral ceasefire (1984-87) that enabled FARC to found 
the Union Patriótica (Patriotic Union) (UP). The UP was a coalition of left-wing parties in alliance 
with the PCC, and achieved some success in the 1986 elections. However, this was to be its 
undoing. Not only did the UP challenge the bipartisan status quo of Colombian politics but it 
signified the rising political challenge of FARC. In response, large landowners, the drug cartels 
and the opposition parties sponsored the formation of paramilitaries, which decimated the UP. 
Between 1986 and 1990 more than 4000 members of the UP and the Communist Party were 
killed. The party’s first president Jaime Pardo Leal was assassinated in 1987. In the wake of his 
death, there was a mass exodus from the UP: the party had been crushed.11 
In the early 1990s FARC decided it was ready to advance to “mobile warfare.”12 With the 
door to political participation firmly closed, FARC now had to rely on its military arm. It was in 
this period that FARC’s political rhetoric also altered subtly. Until then, it had threatened the 
overthrow of the entire political system. This changed to criticizing the government’s 
incompetence in dealing with the country’s problems (social inequality, crime, and deficient 
public services), and presented FARC as the more credible alternative for “good government.”13 
For example, one FARC commander, Simón Trinidad, declared in 1999 that: “the FARC will 
make better use of the natural resources and provide jobs, healthcare, education and housing.”14 
FARC’s military strength grew throughout the 1990s. Buoyed by support from the 
peasantry and funded by income from narcotics the movement continued is military advance. In 
1996, FARC destroyed an army base at Las Delicias in Caquetá and captured 60 soldiers.15 In 
1998, the administration of Andrés Pastrana agreed to a zona de despeje (demilitarised zone) of 





government as ostensibly a goodwill gesture during peace talks, the zona underlined FARC’s 
unmistakeable military strength while providing the opportunity to administer this region with 
“good government.” Most importantly, it elevated FARC to a different political level. It 
demonstrated that FARC was not like the drug cartels or the other smaller non-state armed 
groups. It was a political force to be reckoned with and a potential alternative government.  
By 2002, the zona de despeje experiment had failed. Continuing high levels of violence, 
including kidnappings and assassinations, characterized FARC’s tutelage over the area. The 
central government’s reluctance to renew the zona de despeje inspired FARC to escalate its 
campaign with more than 120 attacks against the nation’s cities and infrastructure.16 FARC’s 
power and influence peaked at this point, with an estimated membership of 20,000. Álvaro 
Uribe, who succeeded Pastrana as President, took a very different line with the FARC. Elected 
on a promise to pursue FARC aggressively, he formulated a comprehensive anti-insurgent and 
anti-narcotics program known as “Plan Colombia.” United States financial support to the 
Colombian military and police was integral to the program. To suppress FARC Uribe 
professionalized the army and also worked with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) 
paramilitary movement, which enjoyed close links with the military. By 2013 the number of 
FARC combatants had been reduced to an estimated 7000 and its territorial control had shrunk. 
Peace talks began on 27 August 2012 under the Presidency of Juan Manuel Santos. The 
two sides reached agreement on land reform, compensation, and political participation in the 
constituent assembly.17 Finally, on November 24, 2016 the parties signed a revised peace deal.18 
As of the June 25, 2017, FARC ceased its armed campaign, disarming and demobilizing under 
United Nations monitoring.  
This section has highlighted FARC’s political development, and has shown how its base-
line policies aimed at agrarian reform remained consistent throughout its four decade long 





been signed, demonstrating how FARC’s fundamental objective, and the basis for much of its 
support, continued to be at the forefront of its struggle throughout the conflict.  
 
FARC and Narcotics 
Narcotics were central to the funding of FARC’s operations, particularly in latter half the 
Colombian Civil War.19 An examination of this aspect of FARC’s campaign is necessary to 
illustrate why narcotics-related violence against civilians should be understood separately from 
the violence more directly related to the movement’s political goals. This section, therefore, 
explores FARC’s relationship with the drugs trade, assesses how the movement adapted to the 
illicit industry, and how it reconciled its political ideology with what became one of its largest 
sources of revenue.  
Coca production has been popular in Colombia since the 1950s. Farmers who had been 
driven to the inhospitable jungle areas around the Amazon found the crop easy to grow and 
extremely profitable. During the 1980s, coca production grew steadily as Colombia’s foremost 
agricultural money-maker, coffee, correspondingly declined in profitability.20 Increasing numbers 
of campesinos were drawn to its cultivation by high external demand and the relatively permissive 
growing conditions fostered by the state’s lack of presence in many rural areas.  
FARC’s interest in coca was driven by three key factors. First, as the harvesting of coca 
became more lucrative, the peasantry under FARC’s control shifted into its production thus 
displacing those crops that once had formed FARC’s subsistence economy. Simply, FARC was 
obliged to acknowledge this shift to illicit agriculture. Second, the greater profitability of the crop 
led to the industrial up-scaling of coca by the cartels and drug-traffickers. In response, the 
Colombian government sought to combat coca production through a blanket policy of crop 
eradication, which targeted both the industrial drug-traffickers and the campesinos. The drug-
traffickers themselves, eager to exploit rural dwellers and seize their profits, also attacked the 





traffickers, as the traffickers looked to expand and the government looked to eradicate. Third, 
FARC itself was determined to extract income from the drugs trade. Aware of the potential 
income from coca, FARC signaled its intent to become involved in the trade at the Seventh 
Guerrilla Conference in 1982.21 Gutierrez-Sanin uses the phrase “coexist” to describe FARC’s 
relationship with the coca industry.22 This is perhaps an understatement of the active role FARC 
took in the coca economy. FARC attempted to reconcile its involvement in drugs with its 
political ideology. Felbab-Brown argued that by regularizing production and challenging 
eradication policies, rebels stood to gain popular support.23 In Colombia this was certainly 
observable. FARC commander, Yazid Arteta, for example, claimed that the movement urged the 
campesinos to set aside a portion of their land for raising food as well as coca, while also protecting 
the peasant economy by battling the landowners and what they had labeled the “narco-
bourgeoisie.”24  
The targeting of coca paste farmers in neighboring countries also fueled the narco-boom 
as cultivation was progressively transplanted to Colombia. By 1997, Colombia surpassed Peru 
and Bolivia as major coca suppliers. In 2009 Saab and Taylor reported that Colombia had 
become the single largest exporter of cocaine in the world (providing 80 per cent of the world’s 
supply).25 Obviously, FARC was not solely responsible for this but it underlined the size of the 
market in which it had become a key player. Revenues from narcotics along with other income-
generation enabled FARC, according to Ortiz, to become wholly self-financing.26 There has been 
debate about the proportion of FARC’s income from drugs. Some studies put it at 50 per cent 
(in 2000)27 whereas Alexandra Guáqueta placed it between 60 and 90 per cent.28 Regardless of 
the exact percentages, it is clear that narcotics were a primary source of revenue for FARC. 
According to Vargas:  
The coca economy reinforced the disconnection between the population and the 





sometimes banned by the insurgency from taking part in state-funded welfare 
programmes. By the same token, it allowed the insurgents to establish themselves as 
regulators of the coca paste market, policing transactions between producers and buyers 
from different “cartels” and playing a role that, for obvious reasons, the Colombian state 
could not perform.29 
To a degree FARC sought to align its involvement in narcotics with its political ideals. Unlike the 
cartels or paramilitaries, it did not establish a vertical presence in the drugs trade, that is to say, 
involving itself at all levels in the trafficking chain: cultivation, production, and distribution.30 
Instead, FARC generated profits from protection fees and from a tax called the gramaje. The 
gramaje was a system of taxes imposed on the different links of the narco-supply chain in FARC’s 
areas of control.31 Usually, the tax was a percentage of the value of the drugs produced and 
exported. Steinitz determined that the FARC had standardized fees in 1999: $15.70 p/kg of coca 
paste, $52.60 p/kg of cocaine produced in territory, $10.50 p/kg of coca and $45 p/kg of 
heroine shipped through its territory.32 In this respect, FARC maintained a horizontal presence in 
the drug trade. Whilst FARC provided protection to the coca farmers, it did not maintain an 
international narco-trafficking presence. It preferred, instead, to use small and medium-sized 
criminal organizations to traffic and distribute the coca from its territory,33 with one 2005 report 
suggesting that while 65 of FARC’s 110 front groups and other operational units were involved 
in some aspect of the drugs trade, the trafficking itself was predominantly controlled by 
organized criminal groups.34  
FARC justified its participation in the drugs trafficking business as a form of peasant 
solidarity. Simon Trinidad of FARC argued that the narcotics industry was a product of the 
Colombian state’s abandonment of the campesinos, which “obliged” farmers “to cultivate illicit 
crops because of a government that has neglected them for many years… we will not leave them 





FARC commanders were incriminated in trafficking as well as cultivation, while the 
decentralized nature of FARC’s command structure meant that the Secretariat could maintain 
deniability.36 Even so, FARC evidently understood both the economic and political gains (in 
terms of peasant support) from its involvement in narcotics. Indeed, in the richest coca-
producing regions, FARC secured a stable economic foundation for peasants by regulating 
market relations and prices.37  
It was through the narcotics industry that FARC came into conflict with the drugs cartels 
and by extension, the state backed paramilitaries. As the narco-economy flourished, the cartels 
extended their influence into remote rural areas, often by purchasing land from cattle ranchers. 
These ranches also provided an avenue for money-laundering and so by the late 1980s, the 
cartels and new landowners possessed about a third of the most fertile grazing land in the 
country.38 The expanding power of the cartels inevitably created friction with FARC. Initially, the 
narco-traffickers tried to reach accommodations with FARC. Viewing the cartels as exploitative 
gangsters, FARC rejected these overtures.39 As FARC pressed into regions like Montes de Maria, 
in the northern part of the country, it began to kidnap drug traffickers and latifundistas 
(landowners). In response, these parties formed the Muerto as los Secuestoseros (Death to 
Kidnappers), a self-defense force, protecting the narco-traffickers, landowners, and state/military 
officials who all had financial interests in the drugs trade. Working closely with the military it 
developed into what became the paramilitary forces of the AUC.  
The AUC was formed with the backing of the armed forces, and received significant 
government support particularly during the Uribe administration. By 2000, it was claimed to 
have as many as 11,200 fighters. The paramilitaries have allegedly killed more than twice as many 
civilians as the insurgents, often by perpetrating village massacres.40 The AUC was formally 
disbanded in 2006, and those paramilitary forces still involved with narcotics became known as 





The AUC remnants of BACRIM and FARC continued their violence. This sub-conflict 
within the greater civil war was not just a conflict over coca plantations. It also emphasized the 
conflicting ideologies in play. The campesinos preferred the authority of the FARC to that of the 
army or paramilitaries because the guerrillas only taxed the farmers once for conducting their 
trade, whereas the army imposed several taxes (for which read, bribes) but also threatened arson 
if cooperation was not forthcoming.41  
FARC, for the most part, managed the coca economy within the scope of its political 
ideals. Arguably, the AUC did the same. The AUC represented the haciendados and latifundistas, the 
large-scale landowners who were the embodiment of the corruption and socio-economic 
disparity with which FARC’s agrarian-minded, left-wing ideology necessarily clashed. In that 
sense, FARC’s involvement with narcotics was an inevitable consequence of the socio-political 
conditions in Colombia, framing the conflict with the paramilitaries in ideological terms, and 
becoming a central feature of its struggle during the civil war.  
Understanding FARC’s relationship with the narcotics industry illuminates the complex 
inter-dependency of politics and drugs in FARC’s strategy. This inter-dependency also highlights 
why micro-level studies of violence against civilians are unable to satisfactorily explain the 
conflict. In particular, through an examination of the AUC/BRICAM set-up, it shall be shown 
that the distinction between a civilian and military combatant was often blurred, thus affecting 
the hypotheses of the micro-level studies. 
Further, while FARC was implicated in the illicit drugs trade, its involvement, 
nevertheless, continued to reflect its political outlook. FARC operated a parallel state structure 
and this had important political consequences,42 securing a social base and assuring the 
movement of a substantial level of support.43 In turn, this defined how the government and 
military perceived FARC. The interdependency of FARC’s political goals with narcotics does not 
mean that all distinctions between “political” violence and money-driven violence are 





order to distinguish where it was being employed in relation to narcotics and where it was an 
extension of politics.  
 
The Inadequacies of Universalistic Explanations of Violence Against Civilians 
 
Zones, Defections and Denunciations 
 
Understanding the complexity of FARC’s evolution and its relationship to the narcotics industry 
begins to illuminate why universalistic micro-level studies of violence against civilians are 
unsatisfactory. This section will explore a number of important studies of violence in civil wars, 
and while not denying the merits of their scholarship it will suggest that by positioning 
themselves as universalistic they create weaknesses in their hypotheses.  
Stathis Kalyvas’s, The Logic of Violence, is one of the first and most extensive micro-level 
studies of violence against civilians. Because of its focus on rational actor/selective violence it is 
regarded as a seminal text. The influence of this work can be seen in the writings of others such 
as those of Metelits, Vargas, Wood, and Hoover-Green. However, the model presented in The 
Logic of Violence is problematic when applied to FARC’s application of violence against civilians in 
the Colombian Civil War.  
Kalyvas’ model of selective violence is based on three distinct but related processes: the 
individual calculus of defection; the individual calculus of denunciation; and the organizational 
calculus of violence. He argues that a political actor’s preferences in conditions of civil war are 
straightforward, which seek to maximize territory and control. To increase control, the actor 
must obtain the exclusive collaboration of civilians and eliminate defection (collaboration with 
rival actor), “and that is the main function of selective violence.”45 He states that there is “no 
anarchy” when one rival actor leaves, another rival actor moves in. The shifts in control are a 
product of two factors: exogenous military resources that allow an actor to conquer, and the use 
of selective violence in territory that is already conquered. Civilians thus consider the “calculus of 





of territorial control. If they believe that defection will benefit them then they will enact that 
decision. If they believe that denouncing a neighbor will provide rewards, then they will do that. 
In short, “civilians must make two separate strategic decisions: whether to defect and whether to 
denounce… political actors must decide whether to use violence and what kind to employ.”46 
To illustrate, he distributes the conflict space into five zones of control. Z1 is total 
incumbent control, and Z5 is total insurgent control. Zones 2, 3, and 4, are contested areas. 
Incumbents primarily control Z2, while the insurgents primarily control Z4, and both control Z3 
equally. These zones also affect defection levels. Only “martyrs” would defect in Z1 and Z2. 
Highly committed individuals defect in Z2 and Z4. Z3 sees the highest levels of defection. The 
benefits of using violence within these zones, he argues, are the consolidation of control through 
eliminating defectors and the deterrence of potential defectors. Actors will use violence when the 
benefits are greater than the costs. Defection is unlikely in Z1 and Z5 and therefore 
denunciations are most likely false. Therefore, selective violence is unlikely to be observed in 
those zones. Selective violence is also unlikely to be observed in Z3 because there is an absence 
of denunciations and counter-denunciations. In Z1 and Z5 there is likely to be indiscriminate 
violence exercised by the rival actor. In contested Z2 and Z4 actors will have both an incentive 
and the ability to use selective violence. In Z3 the incentive to use violence will be high but the 
costs would likely outweigh the benefits as the use of indiscriminate violence in that zone could 
result in mass defections.47  
This theory produces some interesting extrapolations. In particular, the area with the 
highest level of contestation (Z3) is predicted to be an “oasis of peace” amidst the violence. It 
will also have the high levels of defections with low levels of denunciations. Kalyvas states that 
this absence of violence has two implications. First, it suggests that the proverbial “front line” in 
civil war is likely to be the least violent place for civilians. Second, selective violence occurs only 
where the incentives of local and supralocal actors converge. No violence will occur where 





information necessary.48 In short, Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence is a joint process. It relies 
on the convergence of decision making by both the political actors and civilians with the key 
resources being information and violence. From a broad social science standpoint, the theory is 
impressive: the combination of a game theoretical approach with comparative evidence makes it 
persuasive. But does it apply to Colombia? 
The first major criticism of Kalyvas is that his “control-collaboration” model captures 
only those conflicts with two clear political adversaries. Throughout the theory, he refers to these 
two actors as incumbent and insurgents. Repeatedly he uses the examples of the Vietnamese 
Civil War and the American Civil War in which the conflicts did have two distinct political 
contenders. For his main empirical case study, he examines the Greek Civil War, which was 
fought between the government and the forces of the Greek Communist Party. Whilst each of 
these civil wars had complex dynamics, they still possessed two clear sides: an incumbent 
government challenged by rebel forces. This paradigm does not however apply to the Colombian 
Civil War where there were multiple actors at play, as elucidated above. Furthermore, the Greek 
Civil War occurred in an entirely different global-political context to Colombia. Therefore to 
treat diverse instances of civil conflict as comparable over-extends the theory. Kalyvas seeks to 
justify the universal relevance of his theory by stating that “war entails a reductionist logic,” by 
maintaining that “rarely are all actors in a multi-actor conflict simultaneously active in every 
locality of a country and where they are, alliances tend to produce bipolar conflict.”49 It might 
indeed be rare for all actors to be simultaneously active in “every locality of a conflict.” That 
does not mean, however, that all instances of civil war are reducible to a binary conflict. The 
Colombian Civil War is not unique in being characterized by the presence of multiple actors, 
with manifold agendas across numerous locations. This highlights a problem with such 
universalistic studies in general in that they must reduce all conflicts to a lateral theoretical plane 





Kaplan’s study of the Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare (Peasant Worker 
Association of the Carare River) (ATCC) underlines how Kalyvas’ hypothesis is inadequate for 
explaining the Colombian case.50 The association was created following a decade long conflict 
between FARC and another rebel group, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN (National 
Liberation Army). The association came to an agreement with both organizations that civilians 
would neither leave the area, nor take part in the conflict. Thus, between 1987 and 2000 there 
was virtually no conflict-related violence in this region.51 Kaplan questions whether the ATCC 
confirms Kalyvas’ hypothesis.52 By using Kalyvas’ model to explore the shifts in control, he finds 
that if the theory was correct, then the ATCC could only have survived under contested or 
complete control, and that denunciations, threats and violence all should have ceased.  
It is therefore not congruent with Kalyvas’ hypothesis that denunciations and threats 
continued to occur, but did not lead to the killings of civilians.53 Kaplan’s study illustrates that 
Kalyvas’s binary actor model covers over complexity and limits understandings of conflicts such 
as those in Colombia, which saw a multitude of actors appearing at different times over a 40-year 
period. For example, the activities of actors like the drug cartels affected the nature of FARC’s 
violence against civilians in conditions where, contra Kalyvas, the violence was often not about 
territorial control but commercial gain. Indeed, given how narcotics became a defining element 
within FARC’s campaign this points to the wider shortcoming in the Kalyvas model in that it 
ignores how violence against civilians is affected by the struggle for the control of resources, not 
just territory. Again many examples of civil war are thereby excluded.54  
The final criticism of Kalyvas lies with the caveats he places on his argument. He first 
acknowledges that his theory has simplified conflict. He discusses, for example, how his 
assumption about denunciations might be incorrect: “there is evidence from psychological 
experiments that people are not good at assessing risk in general”, he argues.55 He avers also that 
in a conflict environment a civilian’s concept of time is skewed, suggesting that they are only able 





weeks ahead. They might overestimate their own security or have misplaced faith in the promises 
of the political actors to offer stability.56 He argues that his theory is a sensible simplification, a 
theoretical baseline, and that “the identification of its empirical failures is particularly 
productive.”57 These self-deprecating caveats are worthy but ultimately they demonstrate that 
Kalyvas’s insights have limited applicability beyond the specific case studies he uses to validate 
his theories.  
In a 2012 article Kalyvas discussed how his control-collaboration model could be 
extended to other conflicts. He acknowledges criticisms from Vargas,58 who after testing 
Kalyvas’ model on a Colombian city found that paramilitaries were able to use selective violence 
even in areas of little control. He also acknowledges the validity of other alternative approaches, 
such as those of Metelits and Weinstein (to be discussed below).59 However, he again epilogues 
these critical acknowledgements by stating that “rather than seeking to produce a new theory per 
paper (or book)”60 that analysts should use his baseline control-collaboration model. Kalyvas 
may have wanted the sentiment to appear altruistic. Instead, it presents itself as a “get-out” 
clause, a form of academic hedging, and that is an unsatisfactory way of trying to universalize a 
theory.  
 
Extractive and Coercive Behaviors 
 
Claire Metelits provides the only universalistic theory that uses FARC as a case study. She 
employs slightly different terminology to Kalyvas, seeing the treatment of civilians ranging along 
a spectrum from coercive (also referred to as violent) to contractual behavior. Unlike Kalyvas, 
she defines coercive behavior as a range of violent deeds encompassing the “forcible extraction 
of resources from civilians, kidnapping, burning villages, raping and looting, intentional 





of insurgent interactions with civilians than allowed for by Kalyvas, who solely focuses on 
homicides.   
Metelits’s theory argues that insurgents shape their strategies toward local communities 
based on whether they face competition, or “active rivalry.” Active rivals rely on the same pool 
of resources as the insurgents, and this leads to competition. If an incumbent political actor 
possesses the capacity for the exclusive extraction of resources with relatively little threat from 
other armed organizations, it will be likely to seek mutually beneficial ties with local populations. 
Once a threat appears from a rival group or even in the prospect of state reform, however, it is 
more likely to protect its perceived interests through means that can harm locals.62 She contends 
that the objective for insurgent groups is extractive opportunity. This is because there is no 
guaranteed long-term economic foundation for these organizations. The supply of resources is 
likely to be tenuous and therefore insurgent groups will desire as much opportunity as possible 
to exploit the resident resource base. The only way to do this is to control the extractive 
processes within their areas of operation.63   
Metelits analyses three case studies to support her argument: the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA); FARC; and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). She refers to these 
groups as “insurgents,” which she defines as non-state armed actors that use violence to 
reformulate or destroy the foundation of politics in an existing country.64  
In her examination of FARC, which she entitles “From Jekyll to Hyde,” she describes 
how the movement began as a “mediating force in rural Colombia” that maximized its legitimacy 
by providing services for peasants. Even by the end of the 1980s when it commenced 
involvement in the narcotics industry, FARC, she maintained, continued to have a contractual 
relationship with local communities. Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, FARC had become 
“extremely violent in its treatment of the rural population it had previously protected,”65 arising 
out of the appearance of active rivals who competed for resources. Her argument thus rests on 





explanation that ultimately causes her theory to exaggerate the importance of a number of 
factors while missing certain nuances.  
Empirically, Metelits’s theory is based on rigorous evidence. If we evaluate her claims for 
the change from contractual to coercive behavior in 1998 against Restrepo et al’s dataset we can 
discern that her observations are broadly true.66 Restrepo et al describe the move towards 
coercion as an “upsurge” and ascribe it to the rise of the paramilitary groups. This would seem to 
confirm Metelits’s theory that the presence of an active rival in its territory caused FARC to 
become more violent towards civilians because its “thinking shifted to short term-military 
objectives and survival became uncertain.”67 A problem resides, though, in Metelits’s causal 
mechanism. She attributes the rise in violence to the presence of the paramilitaries. Yet, as we 
have shown, FARC was at its strongest in the period from 1996 to 2002, in terms of numbers of 
personnel, territorial control, and income generation (from narcotics, kidnappings and extortion). 
The rise in violence against civilians cannot, therefore, be accredited solely to the presence of a 
unified front of paramilitaries as an “active rival.” FARC was at war. It was strategically logical 
that it would escalate its violence during a point at which it was in the ascendant. FARC enjoyed 
its best chance to assert its political vision and, since war is an extension of politics, it follows 
that its violence intensified.   
The principal shortcoming in Metelits’s argument, however, is that her theory discounts 
the role of agency. This is somewhat surprising because she states at the beginning of her book 
that “too frequently non-state armed actors are misunderstood as being acted upon.”68 Yet she 
also argues that “for insurgents, violence against other armed forces serves a purpose: it is one of 
the primary political tools they use to reshape the foundation of politics in a state.”69 This 
quotation demonstrates an understanding that FARC’s violence was politically instrumental. 
However, she omits civilians from this statement. For Metelits, violence against civilians is purely 
reactionary: a tactic used when FARC was on the military defensive or when its resources were 





campaign. We have already discussed just how important kidnappings and extortion were as a 
source of revenue. Nearly half of FARC’s kidnapping victims were from the public 
administration and defense sectors, like government workers in well-paid jobs who were likely to 
pay ransom demands.70 
For all Metelits’s contentions, her theory fails to discern that coercive behaviors do not 
always stem from a reaction to competition. Her evidence is subordinated to support the notion 
of “active rivalry.” FARC demonstrated consistently throughout its insurgency that violence 
against civilians was always a tool. It was at war with the state. It had to fund itself through 
violent and illicit means. Metelits paints the picture of FARC as a force the identity of which 
changed because of resource conflict and the entrance of active rivals because it fits her 
theoretical narrative. As with Kalyvas, she looks for patterns in other conflicts to confirm her 
hypothesis but in doing so disregards evidence that falsifies her argument. FARC’s aims were 
clear, to establish its own system of governance through defeating the Colombian government 
and to continue to generate revenue through the illicit narcotics trade. Violence against civilians 
was simply a means towards those ends.  
 
Activists and Opportunists 
Finally, we shall consider the work of Jeremy Weinstein. Like Metelits, he perceives that resource 
competition is the primary determinant of conflict. In this respect, he is clearly influenced by 
works like that of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s, Greed and Grievance in Civil War.71 His central 
finding is that rebel groups that emerge in resource-rich environments or with the external 
support of an outside patron tend to commit high levels of indiscriminate violence. In contrast, 
movements that arise in resource-poor contexts perpetrate far fewer abuses and employ violence 
selectively and strategically.72 Weinstein follows a similar definition of violence to Metelits, 
stating that it “refers both to the character of the insurgent actors (the extent to which groups 





killings, abductions, rapes and so on).”73 Again, this is a more capacious definition of violence 
than Kalyvas’s theory allows.  
Weinstein hypothesizes that the profile of an organization’s membership will affect the 
type of violence employed against civilians. Ready access to raw materials means that violence 
can be easily enacted without civilian consent. This factor also shapes the individuals who 
participate. He identifies two distinct forms of rebellion: 1) “Activist” rebellions, where 
participation is risky and short-term gains are unlikely. Here, rebel groups tend to attract only the 
most committed investors; 2) “Opportunistic” rebellions, where participation involves fewer 
risks and individuals can expect to be rewarded immediately for their involvement. These groups 
tend to attract consumers. The membership profile thus affects internal organization and the 
strategies pursued in war. Activist rebellions, for example, must extract the resources they need 
from civilians without destroying their base of support and sustenance.74 Furthermore, groups 
that do commit high levels of indiscriminate violence do so not because of ethnic hatred or for 
strategic benefits but because group leaders are less able to discipline the use of force in 
situations where membership of an armed organization is determined by the “endowments” 
(resources) available that can be gained through war.75  
Weinstein also differentiates between two categories of endowments. First, economic 
endowments: this refers to resources that can be mobilized to finance the start-up and 
maintenance of a rebel organization, such as gold, diamonds, oil and narcotics. Second, social 
endowments: this refers to “distinctive identities and dense inter-personal networks that can be 
readily mobilized in support of collective action.”76 Endowments are important as they contour 
and constrain the range of strategies leaders can employ. Economic endowments will attract 
opportunists (consumers) whereas social endowments will attract committed activists (investors). 
Weinstein accepts that no group only uses economic or social endowments but his theory is that 
more of one endowment affects organizational membership and the application of violence.77





Army (NRA) in Uganda, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), the Sendero Luminoso 
(Shining Path) in Peru and an off-shoot of the Sendero, the Comité Regional del Alto Huallaga 
(Regional Committee of the Upper Huallaga Valley). He argues that the NRA was victorious 
after a six-year campaign characterized by “tremendous political mobilisation, the refashioning of 
democratic governing structures during the conflict and an uncharacteristic restraint in the use of 
violence.”78 In Mozambique, RENAMO were known for high levels of indiscipline and 
indiscriminate violence. In Peru, the Regional Committee of the Upper Huallaga Valley 
abandoned ideological investment in favor of involvement in the drugs trade, while the broader 
Sendero movement maintained the “carefully orchestrated the use of revolutionary violence to 
accomplish its political objectives.”79 The reason these groups (although similar in their 
opposition, objective and context) differed in their use of violence lay in their access to 
resources. The NRA had a “committed and culturally homogenous core” but lacked economic 
resources.80 In contrast, RENAMO had the full backing of the Rhodesian regime and then the 
apartheid government in South Africa. The Sendero lacked economic resources and therefore 
relied heavily on local support, whereas in the Upper Huallaga Valley Sendero elements became 
involved in the coca trade and their ideological commitment eroded.  
Weinstein justifies his case study selections by claiming that the rebel organizations all 
faced a reasonably strong state apparatus, that they emerged at times of political transition, and 
that all had the primary objective of overthrowing the government, controlling the central state, 
and its resources. However, these factors account for the causes of any number of civil wars.81 
There is nothing peculiar about the reasons for these emerging movements. All rebellions arise 
from a desire to overthrow the central state or at least the authority in the rebellious region. They 
all take advantage of an authority gap when the central regime is weak.82 These case studies were 
chosen, it may be suggested, largely because they confirm the hypothesis, a recurring theme in 





pattern, developed a theory, extrapolated it to other conflicts, and sought evidence that confirms 
the thesis.   
Weinstein’s argument is predicated on the initial recruitment interaction between the 
leaders and the members of an organization. Kalyvas questions this by saying that Weinstein 
misses two critical dimensions: interactions between rebels and civilians, and between rebels and 
state forces.83 Civilians are not completely useless to rebels: they can be co-opted into self-
defense militias and resist state backed forces, a phenomenon observable in Colombia and 
Peru.84 Kalyvas also notes that Weinstein’s argument ought to apply in reverse, to state behavior. 
In that sense Weinstein’s theory implies that if modern professional militaries attract individuals 
into their ranks due to the resource benefits to be gained, via salaries and other benefits for 
instance, they too would be prone to mass indiscipline and abuse of civilians. The criticism is 
perhaps unfair on Weinstein given that he specifically caveats that he is discussing only rebel 
organizations. However, he overlooks the fact that violence in civil wars is invariably applied 
strategically to gain certain objectives against the state, which itself is attempting to resist the 
extension of rebel influence. Armed groups must therefore adapt to changing realities if they are 
to survive. Kalyvas contends that the neglect of the shifting state actor/non-state actor 
relationship clashes with “the book’s unflinching commitment to the most stringent version of 
path dependency,”85 because it assumes that only initial endowments matter, and once an armed 
group attracts a specific type of individual, it is unable to change.  
In discussing FARC Weinstein maintains that “resilience” is one of the main challenges 
faced by rebel organizations. He argues that FARC was compelled to accept the shift to illicit 
crop plantation because that was the only way it could maintain its legitimacy and authority 
among the communities in which it was strongest. He continues by saying that FARC reluctantly 
assumed the task of policing criminal and delinquent activity, and then had to implement the 
gramaje system to pay for these services. Applying his theory, he claims that it was endowment 





as a resource that drew “consumers” into the fray, thus eroding FARC’s political ideals and 
increasing its violence against civilians.86 However, as this analysis has pointed out, FARC’s 
decision to engage with the narcotics industry is not as clear-cut as Weinstein thesis implies, 
ignoring as it does the role of the state and the paramilitaries in explaining the upsurge in 
violence against civilians. Again, this interpretation of FARC’s transformation, like Metelits, 
removes FARC’s own agency and strategic decision-making.  
A further criticism concerns Weinstein’s causal mechanism. The argument that resource-
wealthy organizations will attract undisciplined “consumers” who extract resources through 
coercion is, according to Kalyvas, “far from watertight.”87 A materialist individual might still 
become involved with a highly disciplined armed organization. Kalyvas questions why the 
extraction of resources requires coercion rather than side-payments or why an armed group with 
external patrons (like RENAMO) would need to resort to violence at all if it could afford to 
forgo the extraction of resources from civilians.88 Resource-poor insurgencies, Kalyvas suggests, 
do not have to rely on “social endowments.” They can forcibly recruit and abduct (like the 
Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda), while even wealthy armed groups forcibly recruit anyway 
(such as Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone). Furthermore, as Gutierrez-Sanin observes, 
highly motivated ideological groups are often more likely to engage in genocidal behaviors, one 
of the most extreme forms of violence against civilians.89  
Finally, the example of FARC was always liable to be an outlier for Weinstein’s theory. 
FARC was known for being a disciplined organization with stringent rules. FARC did not pay its 
members.90 Yet, for the better part of three decades it could be described as a resource-rich 
movement. Arjona and Kalyvas also claim that at the recruitment phase only 23 per cent of 
FARC combatants were attracted by the promise of money or goods.91 While Weinstein declares 
that non-state armed groups can have both social and economic endowments, FARC engaged in 
a range of violent behaviors throughout the conflict: behaviors that largely reflected its political 





during Uribe’s presidential inauguration.93 Such actions were conducted at a time when both 
FARC’s membership and its resource revenue were at their highest.  
 
The Inadequacy of Universalistic Explanations 
The section above articulated how some key theories of rebel group behavior have difficulty in 
accounting for FARC. Collectively, they illustrate how attempts to derive universal 
understandings from complex, contingent circumstances, result in extrapolations that are 
disputable. These studies, for example, invariably remove civilian preferences and choices from 
the equation and assert mechanistic understandings of armed group behaviors. In fact, it 
mattered little whether FARC was partly dominant in a territory, faced active competition, or 
recruited opportunists, the likelihood was simply that if FARC encountered areas that were 
resistant to its political ideology then the likelihood was that violence against the community 
would occur. It is debatable whether any of these micro-level theories add anything of greater 
value to this basic reality.  
Another recurring problem is that these studies assume that insurgencies constitute 
“irregular war” or “asymmetric conflict,” without really questioning whether such terms contain 
any inherent meaning. This assumption affects how these theories view the practice of violence 
against civilians: often perceiving it as an involuntary side effect of war because the non-state 
group resorts to guerrilla tactics, which predisposes itself – supposedly – towards the coercion of 
the civilian population. The distinction between a “regular” and “irregular” war is a false one. 
Wars are never binary conflicts between equally matched opponents. All war is asymmetrical. 
Moreover, to proclaim that irregular wars are merely those characterized by the presence of non-
state actors or the use of guerrilla tactics is equally arbitrary since these factors can, and have 
been, present in many instances of war.94 Describing the Colombian civil war as “irregular” in 
nature and presenting FARC’s violence against civilians as an unfortunate by-product of the 





proactive decisions, and in the case of FARC be interpreted as a logical extension of its politics 
through violence or to further its narcotics-related endeavors.  
As this study will disclose, the thinking of Carl von Clausewitz is useful and relevant to 
understand the notion of violence against civilians. He is notably absent from the works 
discussed above. Apart from a brief mention in Kalyvas,95 they do not address any of 
Clausewitz’s ideas. Given Clausewitz pre-eminence as a theorist of war, such an omission is 
surprising, even inexplicable. Do they not believe Clausewitz can be relevant in the modern age? 
Or perhaps they realize that the application of his theory refutes much of what they argue?  
Kalyvas does not properly contend with Clausewitz, though he does end up replicating 
certain Clausewitzian arguments in different form. For example, Kalyvas states that once control 
is achieved, violence becomes redundant, that the higher an actor’s level of control, the less likely 
the actor will use violence.96 Clausewitz reasons that the aims of a war are to disarm your enemy 
and to assert political will through violence: “As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat 
me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did to him.”97 The 
defeat of the enemy constitutes dominant control for Kalyvas. Therefore, with dominant control, 
violence becomes redundant. In zones of partial control, the enemy is not defeated, and violence 
must continue. Metelits also contains some Clausewitzian overtones. She states: “For insurgents, 
violence against other armed forces serves a purpose: it is one of the primary political tools they 
use to reshape the foundation of politics in a state.”98 This statement is coherent in Clausewitzian 
terms but she overlooks the fact that violence committed against civilians can also be a political 
tool. As shall be discussed, all violence is purposive including that perpetrated against civilians.  
To summarize, these universalistic studies have all presented explanations for 
understanding violence against civilians, and measured against the case studies chosen, their 
hypotheses are confirmed. Inadequacies arise, though, in a desire to generalize these explanations 
across time and space to all civil wars. In doing so, they are unable to make specific exceptions 





to universal applicability. At the very least such theoretical inadequacy suggests the need for an 
alternative framework to the understand violence committed against civilians by FARC in the 
Colombian Civil war.  
The following alternative framework is outlined because it bridges the resource versus 
political divide that weakens these universalistic explanations. As this analysis has maintained, 
FARC’s violence cannot be assigned to one or another. Narcotics aided its struggle but became 
so integral to its identity that it clearly influenced its violence against civilians. FARC’s political 
aims remained constant, as evidenced by its continued attacks against state infrastructure and 
kidnappings of public sector workers. That there was an ebb and flow to the civil war is 
undeniable. It is an inescapable feature of most wars and is fully accounted for by Clausewitz’s 
observation that, war is unpredictable, “composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, 
which are to be regarded as a blind natural force: of the play of chance and probability within 
which the creative spirit is free to roam: and of its element of subordination as a political 
instrument.”99 FARC was both proactive and reactive. The movement exploited a large 
repertoire of violence, which peaked and troughed throughout the conflict. No single 
explanation will truly be adequate and that is why these universalistic studies remain 
unsatisfactory. 
 
Clausewitz and FARC 
“The alleged obsolescence of Clausewitz in the early twenty-first Century,” according to Daase 
and Davis, “is attributed to a time-bound framework of analysis and a failure to anticipate forms 
of warfare beyond the rather symmetric pitched battlefield exchanges of large regular armies.”100 
This statement emphasizes one of the challenges in establishing Clausewitz’s relevance to 
modern civil war. Contemporary scholars often claim that Clausewitz is outmoded and that his 
thinking only applies to big battles, which have rarely been witnessed in modern warfare since 





this section is to demonstrate the enduring relevance of Clausewitz to modern civil wars – that is 
wars fought within the confines of a nation-state – and, in particular, to show how his 
theorizations are useful for understanding FARC’s violence against civilians. 
Commentators have noted that terms such as irregular war, insurgency, unconventional 
war and guerrilla war are encumbered by definitional ambiguity.102 In particular, they observe that 
notion of asymmetric war is a truism. In practice all wars are asymmetrical. In fact, they are all 
unique and non-reproducible in form.103 For Clausewitz this establishes a central insight: “Wars 
must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations that give rise to them.104 It is 
most unlikely that Clausewitz would have sympathized with the continuous attempts of modern 
political science to separate war into typologies. As Harry Summers, a modern interpreter of 
Clausewitz, declared: “a war is a war is a war is a war is a war.”105 This comment was intended to 
reinforce Clausewitz’s argument that war is, regardless of context, “an act of force to compel our enemy 
to do our will.”106 Clausewitz is, in this respect, enunciating the lasting essence of war. The outer 
form of war always changes in each specific context owing to variations in relationships between 
popular passions, the play of chance and probability, and the influence of politics, along with a 
host of tangible and intangible factors, ranging from terrain, socio-political history, the quality of 
those doing the fighting, the character of political authority and so on. Yet, despite the infinite 
variations, war nevertheless possesses an “enduring constitution:”107 the use of violence to attain 
political objectives. Clausewitz deploys the metaphor of a chameleon to illustrate the point that 
the essential biology of war remains constant but its appearance changes in different 
circumstances. Clausewitz writes:  
 
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given 
case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical 
trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded 





spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, 
which makes it subject to reason alone.108  
 
The chameleon-like nature of war, and the constant fluctuating interactions of passion, chance 
and reason within the permanence of the “paradoxical trinity,” relates well to the example of 
FARC and the Colombian Civil War. The “blind instinct” of popular passion is clearly apparent 
in the original historic animosity left over from La Violencia and the perceived injustices 
perpetrated by the hacendados and Colombian government. The play of probability and chance 
reflects the endless variables that ineluctably manifest themselves during a four-decade rebellion. 
The subordination of violence to the political instrument is discernible in the manner in which 
FARC sought to harness the social and material forces at its disposal to achieve its objectives. 
 As this study as already revealed, FARC’s political aims did change during the conflict 
Yet Clausewitz accounts for this: “The political object is no despotic lawgiver… it must 
accommodate itself to the nature of the means.”109 FARC was often constrained in its ability to 
apply force against its government and state backed adversaries. FARC was aware of its 
limitations and its political aims changed over time. After the failure of the Union Patriótica, for 
example, FARC came to believe that seeking political influence within established constitutional 
structures was unlikely to be successful. Similarly, following the granting of the zona de despeje, 
FARC began to see an extension of that zona as a key military objective.  
Critics of Clausewitz’s contemporary relevance almost always overlook that he 
discoursed many times on insurgent/rebel conduct and small-unit warfare in earlier works. In 
Bekenntnisdenkschrift (Testimonial), Volksbewaffnung (Arming of the people), “Lectures on Small 
War” and “On the Political Advantages and Disadvantages of the Prussian Institutions of the 
Landwehr” Clausewitz discussed many points that might be said to resonate with more modern 
ideas of insurgency. In the Bekenntnisdenkschrift (1812) he developed a political argument and 





Volksbewaffnung he addressed the practical as well as theoretical aspects of popular revolt and 
guerrilla warfare. Finally, in the “Lectures on Small War” (1810 and 1811) he analyzed small-unit 
warfare and considered the rebellion in the Vendée, the Tyrolean uprisings of 1809, and the 
Spanish insurrection in the peninsular war against Napoleonic France.110  
In the Bekenntnisdenkschrift Daase and Davis show that Clausewitz had a keen 
understanding of the potential of “ideologically motivated irregulars drawn from the 
population.”111 “Very few people”, he observed, “have a clear understanding of the full extent of 
this fearsome, decisive measure, which throws the country into a state of dangerous crisis. They 
do not understand how individual citizens of communities united into loose bands can possess 
the daring courage to resist a large army.”112  
Of particular note, Clausewitz discusses the Landsturm, a citizen militia or military force 
of inferior quality to the Landwehr (standing army). Clausewitz described the formation of the 
Landsturm as the coming together of “two to three communities,” which “create a band or a 
company… the bands of a county constitute a column or a Landsturm and the Landsturm of an 
entire province small army.”113 This structural formula, in fact, has clear similarities to FARC’s 
system of frentes and bloques. Furthermore, even the objectives of the Landsturm ring true “to 
prevent deliveries and contributions of all kinds… to fight enemy detachments which show up in 
the province… to secure the materiel that their own government wants to extract from the 
country.”114 A modern parallel in Colombia suggests itself in that FARC was noted for its use of 
anti-aircraft missiles against the government’s crop eradication strategies during the Plan 
Colombia years. 115  
Clausewitz anticipated the tactics and strategy used in these kinds of campaigns, when he 
declared that the “task of the individual bands is to attack weak parties and enemy posts, to take 
away and disperse supplies… one of the primary objectives is to seize artillery, munitions, 
foodstuffs.”116 In noting how small-unit combat units can be deployed, he stated that “they can 





be conducted on unpaved roads and in opposite directions.”117 Such attributes prefaced the 
advocacy of guerrilla war that Mao Tse-tung espoused in On Guerrilla Warfare.118 
There are also parallels between the Tyrolean uprising and the Colombian conflict. Both 
were uprisings organized by peasants. Both were in response to wealthier land-owning classes 
imposing their rule and taxes onto private land. Here, Clausewitz understood small-unit warfare 
and the limitations of a peasant force versus a state’s standing army. He perceived the likely 
tactics that would be employed by such groups. It is a testament to the lasting relevance of his 
observations that these tactics remain the most effective for non-state armed groups today.  
Of course, the dynamics and longevity of these conflicts differ greatly. Clausewitz’s 
Landsturm and the Tyrolean peasants did not have to contend with paramilitaries, illicit crops and 
international intervention. Moreover, the Landsturm were established by a sovereign state that 
had been invaded by Napoleonic France. Clausewitz himself was certainly writing at time when 
notions of Westphalian sovereignty and the nation-state were paramount, but none of this 
should detract from an appreciation of Clausewitz’s of the applicability of a great deal of his 
thinking to non-state actors.119 
Establishing Clausewitz’s relevance to the Colombian conflict is important. Since 
Clausewitz never addressed the issue directly, critics might question how this relates to an 
understanding violence against civilians? Comprehending Clausewitz’s thinking allows us to see 
the purpose behind the means, namely, the extension of politics through violence. FARC 
attacked civilians because it serviced its goals. For instance, the data on kidnappings provided by 
the National Center for Historical Memory indicates that 51 per cent of FARC’s victims were 
from the public administration and defense sector, 39 per cent from the agricultural sector, and 
33 per cent from the commercial sector.120 Why did the FARC kidnap these civilians? The 
answer is because it furthered its objectives of undermining state authority. The application of 
Clausewitz’s analytical framework enables us to perceive the changing relationships between the 





To paraphrase Summers, violence is violence is violence is violence. Searching for 
universalistic patterns does not change the fact that violence has but one purpose in war, to 
advance political objectives. In this regard, somewhat ironically, in seeking to advance 
universalizing explanations those like Kalyvas, Weinstein and Metelits neglect one of the few 
valid universal claims about the nature of war. In fact, all these studies exist in contradiction, 
because in the pursuit of the universal they become mired in the particular. Looking for patterns 
in individual instances of war will always trip up the analyst. Beyond violence for a purpose there 
are no reproducible patterns of war. 
Understanding Clausewitz thus releases us from being mired in fruitless, and easily 
falsifiable, explanations for violence. More importantly, it permits the examination of violence at 
a far more disaggregated level. We can look at individual kidnappings, assassinations, homicides, 
bombings, and so on, and ask the pertinent questions. Who perpetrated the attacks? What effects 
were they intended to have? Did they achieve these goals in practice?  
In the case of FARC, its repertoires of violence ultimately possessed one singular 
purpose, to achieve its political goals. Utilizing this framework in conjunction with an 
appreciation of the role that narcotics played in the Colombian Civil War we can discern the 
underlying purpose in FARC’s strategy. This understanding prevents a descent into a nugatory 
political versus resource-based conflict argument and allows for an appreciation of FARC’s 
involvement in narcotics. FARC undoubtedly put much effort into generating income from the 
drugs trade, but with the essential purpose of furthering its objectives against the Colombian 
state.  
 
Coca and the FARC 
The previous section has established why the Clausewitzian framework is relevant to FARC and 
the wider Colombian conflict. Of course, Clausewitz did not have any comprehension of the 





Narcotics were the proverbial game changer for FARC, creating a unique conflict dynamic, 
which Richani refers to as a “war system.”121 Regardless of what one calls it, this dynamic is not a 
pattern in a global series of modern civil wars and has not been replicated in other conflicts.122 
The extent to which FARC became involved in the narcotics industry informed its strategy, 
including the employment of violence against civilians.  
As well as being a potent source of revenue, narcotics brought FARC into contention 
with other armed groups, which fostered a set of circumstances particular to the Colombian 
conflict. Paramilitaries such as the AUC and BACRIM had a broad right-wing political ideology 
and at times were only loosely distinguishable from the Colombian government and armed 
forces.123 The conflation of the paramilitaries and government forces presented a pitfall for a 
number of universalistic studies. 
FARC’s involvement in narcotics should not be seen to denote a simplistic binary 
between “political” and “criminally” motivated violence. However, when looking at violence 
against civilians, a distinction between armed force directed towards furthering FARC’s 
commercial interests in the drugs trade and more directly focused violence centered on 
advancing its political interests can be made. The universalistic studies this discussion has 
examined often do not account for this distinction. There are certainly difficulties in discerning 
what might constitute narcotics related violence from the violence of the wider conflict. Data on 
this is subject is not easily quantifiable. Nevertheless, an appreciation of the importance of 
FARC’s involvement in narcotics and the similarities they bear with other drug-trafficking 
organizations is fruitful.  
From a purely economic standpoint, the revenue generated from narcotics is one factor 
that helps explain the longevity of FARC’s insurgency. In 1998, Richani estimated that FARC 
accrued US$180 million from the gramaje. Given how integral narcotics became to FARC’s 
development, it raises questions as to why academics have not properly scrutinized the impact 





conflict with the narco-traffickers, but the broader universalistic theories she sought to purvey 
did not fully comprehend the effects on FARC”s repertoires of violence. To gain an 
understanding of how narcotics permeated the FARC”s organization, this section will assess how 
the governance institutions of the FARC reflected its involvement in the narcotics trade.  
The governance arrangements of any armed non-state organization will inevitably affect 
its functions and capabilities. In this respect, FARC’s internal organizational composition bears 
comparison with a number of ostensibly criminal drugs cartels, and suggests similarities in the 
employment of violence towards non-members. To illustrate, this study will examine the parallels 
between FARC and La Familia Michoacana, a contemporary Mexican cartel based in Michoacán.  
From the late 1980s onwards, FARC began to exhibit analogous characteristics with 
criminally motivated non-state armed groups the world over, with violence and coercion being 
exercised against the state or private individuals to support commercial activities.124 In this 
respect, FARC possess similarities with other drug-trafficking organizations in South America, 
an understanding of which assists in explaining a number of aspects of its violence against 
civilians. In Social Order of the Underworld Skarbeck discusses how non-state actors can define and 
enforce property rights more effectively than state institutions because they can rely on local 
expertise and information.125 This is certainly true of FARC, which performed the role of the 
state throughout most of the territories it controlled. Skarbek argues that the need for criminal 
non-state actors to facilitate social cooperation is of great importance in order for contraband 
markets to operate effectively.126 An inability to establish alternative systems of governance 
merely creates incentives for the local community to cooperate with government agencies or 
competitor organizations. Thus, it stands to reason that some of the FARC’s violence against 
civilians was intended to sustain the day-to-day management of the coca plantations. Violent acts 
were perpetrated with the intent to improve or protect its business.  
Here the parallel with La Familia Michoacana (LFM) presents itself. LFM started as a small 





Mexico.127 It also generated revenue from extortion and kidnapping, with many local businesses 
in the Michoacán region paying for “protection services.” LFM’s structure bears comparison 
with FARC. It is ruled from the top by an executive council: a second level middle management 
coordinates; a third tier consists of territorial managers, cell leaders, and regional and municipal 
cells that specialize in specific tasks.128 LFM divides its territory into plazas but we could easily 
supplant that nomenclature with the FARC term “bloque.”  
LFM lays great emphasis on internal cooperation. Upon recruitment, new members must 
undergo intense indoctrination. This includes cleansing members of any drug or alcohol 
addiction.129 LFM has a strict code of conduct. Violation of the code carries severe punishment. 
Desertion has a blanket punishment of death “whoever leaves La Familia dies.”130 FARC, 
likewise, also had strict indoctrination processes, which included regular lessons on politics. The 
movement stripped the recruit of personal property and discouraged sexual activity or relations 
between combatants. FARC was even known to encourage female combatants to have 
abortions.131 In the database found on a 58th Front laptop in 2007 there was a list of offenses 
committed by members of that Front with their respective punishment. Indiscipline, disorder or 
failure to maintain standards was met with chores. More serious infractions incurred reprimands 
(though it is unclear what these entailed) and a strong dose of physical activity. Desertion was 
always punished with the death sentence.132 
Both FARC and LFM stressed the need to foster positive relations with local 
communities. In Vargas’s study of armed non-state actors in South Bolivar he describes how 
FARC organized informal local assemblies just before local elections to deliberate and choose 
the winners ex ante.133 FARC also collaborated with the peasants in protests against the 
government’s crop-eradication policies.134 Similarly, LFM also provides the local community with 
private and public goods, acting as guardians of Michoacán and promoting themselves as models 





Whilst LFM and FARC do have a number of affinities this must not be conflated to 
argue that FARC were “narco-guerrillas” or “narco-terrorists.” FARC’s ideology was based on 
Marxism whereas for the LFM, to the extent that it has an ideological outlook, is based on 
religion. FARC’s goal was explicitly political in contrast to LFM’s entirely narcotics based 
interests. Thus, parallels do exist in internal governance structures but the motivations for 
violence against civilians ultimately differ.  
FARC always outwardly presented itself as being uninvolved in the narcotics trade at the 
trafficking level. However, in late 2000, an investigation into the 16th Front showed that that 
front was operating as a cartel. Steinitz describes how the 16th Front obliged farmers to report 
the number of hectares of the coca plant planted and harvest dates. The coca paste was then 
turned into cocaine, which was traded to a Brazilian trafficker Luis Fernando da Costa who 
supplied arms to the 16th Front.136 Clearly, the 16th Front was not operating a simple taxation of 
coca production. It was creating the product and trading it across borders. In March 2002, the 
United States Justice Department indicted three FARC members for selling cocaine. Steinitz 
used this evidence to justify his description of FARC as narco-terrorists, even though this was 
not the norm for the rest of the movement. Undoubtedly, the 16th Front’s raison d’être became 
more about narcotics than politics. If one were to investigate the 16th Front’s violence against 
civilians in its territory it would be unlikely to reflect FARC’s political objectives.  
This section suggests that FARC’s involvement in narcotics necessitates a distinct 
understanding of its violence against civilians. That the movement shared a number of 
institutional characteristics with prominent drug-trafficking organizations is not a mere 
coincidence. FARC learnt from its initial interactions with drug traffickers such as Gonzalo 
Rodríguez Gacha “El Mexicano” who created a private army, Los Masetos, to combat FARC in 
the late 1980s.137 The movement developed a system that was reconcilable with its political ideals 
in the gramaje. FARC’s internal structures partly replicated other drug-trafficking organizations 





However, this does not mean that FARC was a criminal organization, and can therefore 
be typed accurately as “narco-terrorists,” as Steinitz has argued.138 FARC was a revolutionary 
movement and the commitment to its overarching political goals constrained any conversion to 
outright criminality. As Saab and Taylor maintain, “for an armed group to transition into a 
criminal organisation, it would need to supplant its political motivations with a drive to pursue 
illegal profits.”139 FARC never supplanted its political ideals with the “drive to pursue illegal 
profits” but the “drive” did bring it into conflict with paramilitaries, the government and 
civilians.  
An understanding of its violence against civilians to facilitate FARC’s involvement 
narcotics must be considered alongside its more explicitly politically motivated use of armed 
force.  This is necessary to inform a complete picture of FARC’s goals and strategy. But it also 
underlines a common weakness in universalistic micro-level studies, which are unable to address 
the extent of FARC’s involvement with the narcotics industry because the movement does not 
fit their theories. Consequently, they tend to conflate narcotics-related violence with violence 
more directly intended to advance political objectives. Invariably this leads to resource-based 
arguments, which either discount the political aims of FARC or else relegate narcotics to a 
criminal venture solely maintained for its revenue. Neither of these reductive approaches is 




The aim of this analysis has been to demonstrate why universalistic micro-level studies of 
violence against civilians are inadequate in explaining FARC’s strategy in the Colombian Civil 
War. These studies endeavor to consolidate multiple instances of violence in individual conflicts 
into intelligible patterns for extrapolation across all civil wars. On a case-by-case basis, these 
studies are insightful. Further, to be clear, this analysis is not arguing that any attempt to develop 





frameworks through which empirical anomalies can be identified. Consequently, even when they 
inevitably falter (as all theories must do under the principle of falsifiablity), they still have value 
because they enable better understanding of some behaviors of some actors, some of the time. 
Nevertheless, the selling point of micro-level studies is the proposition that there are clearly 
detectible patterns in war. It is equally valid, then, for other analyses to discern where anomalies 
and incongruities exist in such theories. The argument here has, in this regard, discerned that the 
central problem of micro-level theories is that they seek to generalize their observations in order 
to create a universal hypothesis. At that point these theories break down. This study has shown 
that in their attempt to universalize, they mischaracterize the nature of war and the context-
specificity of civil wars. 
The alternative theoretical framework advanced here is a response to these universalistic 
micro-level studies. It avoids looking for patterns at a micro-level and seeks to comprehend 
FARC’s violence against civilians through the dual-plane of politics and narcotics. This 
understanding is useful because it separates two different aspects of FARC’s violence. It 
highlights the interactions that FARC’s ideology had when it encountered the lucrative narcotics 
trade. On a macro-level, these factors are inter-dependent. But when examining FARC’s violence 
against civilians, we can recognize that whilst such acts of violence may appear on the surface to 
bear comparison with other civil wars, the reasons underlying the violence are not. A 
Clausewitzian approach allows us to understand that violence in war is always purposive and is 
an extension of the political instrument. Differentiating FARC’s politically directed armed force 
from that used to manage its involvement in narcotics is analytically useful. As this study has 
shown, the two have different motivations and should not be conflated. 
In utilizing the Clausewitzian framework the point of this paper is not to imply that the 
thinking of Carl von Clausewitz offers us the single truth that shall miraculously liberate us from 
false thinking. We do not speak from a position of Olympian detachment, which would indeed 





other: a falsifiable thesis that offers limited insight and understanding. What this paper is arguing, 
therefore, is not that there are no permanently operating variables in war, per se, simply that – 
thus far - no alternative theory of war, or critique, has succeeded in surpassing the Clausewitzian 
paradigm for its parsimony and elegance. In this manner, the evaluation set forth in this paper 
has employed Clausewitz’s ideas to demonstrate why micro-level studies of violence are 
unsatisfactory. Looking for universalistic patterns to explain violence against civilians in 
conditions of civil strife is a Sisyphean task. Violence against civilians is complex. It can be 
proactive and reactive. It resides in the decisions and actions of individuals who can be 
motivated by many different factors. Emotions can affect violence. So too can surroundings and 
circumstance. The Colombian Civil War is no exception to this and demonstrates that ultimately 
there are no reliable, reproducible, patterns of conflict, micro-level or otherwise. 
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